RANSOMWARE MITIGATION STRATEGIES Oct. 12, 2022

AGENDA

What is ransomware & how has it evolved?

How does ransomware work?

Prevention and mitigation strategies

Ransomware response

ORIGINS OF RANSOMWARE

Ransomware is an ever-evolving form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the system that rely on helm unstable.

> Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency




Every functioning commercial enterprise needs a marketplace to sell goods and currency to purchase goods.

RANSOMWARE BANDWAGON: ALL ABOARD!!!

In 2016, there was a massive uptick in ransomware variants as cybercriminals were organizing their business models to be more efficient. Ransomware as a service was created which started a golden age for cybercriminals in 2017.



2016-1028: The Golden Era of Ransomware






RANSOMWARE AS A SERVICE (RAAS) OPERATION


Business Model

RaaS Operators	RaaS Affiliates
Develops ransomware code Recruit affiliates on forums	Pays to use ransomware or profit-sharing agreement Agrees on service fee per collected ransom
 Gives affiliates access to a "build your own ransomware" package Creates dedicated "Command & Control" dashboard for affiliate to track the package 	 Targets victims Sets ransom demands Configures post-compromise user message
	Compromises victim's assetsExecutes ransomware
Sets up victim payment portal "Assists" affiliates with victim negotiations	Communicates with the victim via chat portals or other means
Manages a dedicated leak site	Manages decryption keys



RANSOMWARE EVOLUTION: NEW RECIPE, SAME OLD DISH

- Ransomware has evolved from a "smash and grab" crime of opportunity to a sophisticated, well-planned heist.
- These criminals are investing more time to infiltrate an organization and understand how it operates before detonating ransomware.
- They are employing new methods, dubbed "double extortion," where data is stolen before encryption and threatened to be released.
- They understand the cyber insurance market and are demanding ransoms within coverage to increase likelihood of payment.



* Figure 6. Ransomware over time in breaches

RANSOMWARE OPERATORS M.O.





Figure 5. Select enumerations in non-Error, non-Misuse breaches (n=4,250)



Method of attack (HOW)




Figure 19. Top Action varieties in breaches (n=3,875)

If it's on the internet it will be targeted...and if it has a login, you can be sure it's constantly being hit with login attempts.

breaches (n=3,279)

DISRUPTING THE ATTACK CHAIN

Event Chains





Figure 30. Number of steps per breach in non-Error brea









Our job is to complicate the attack as much as possible.



HOW DOES RANSOMWARE GET IN?



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



Figure 39. Select action varieties within vectors in System Intrusion Ransomware incidents (n=1,032)

HOW DOES RANSOMWARE GET IN?








Figure 39. Select action varieties within vectors in System Intrusion Ransomware incidents (n=1,032)

HOW DOES RANSOMWARE SPREAD?








INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 101




Friendly Force Activities









BANG HAPPENS!!!



REACTION AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES



TAKEAWAYS

Left of Bang

Know your points of weakness

Internet facing asset discovery & vulnerability identification Identify remote access tools and lock down (editing, third parties, etc.) Understand connectivity points between third parties Execute a detailed risk assessment against active directory

• Impede attack progression

Implement advanced secure email gateway
Automate phishing email pullback
Deploy MFA on all internet facing assets (extra credit: SSO + MFA)
Utilize endpoint detect response software everywhere possible

Shrink your attack surface

Remove assets in DMZ with SASE solutions or cloud applications Get rid of internet facing FTP servers

Reduce blast radius

Isolate stations from each other (segment network)
Isolate on-air chain from regular users (micro-segmentation)

Build resiliency

Perform regular, frequent backups & isolate from network
Test backups regularly & use immutable storage where possible

• Update incident response plan

Establish a ransomware specific playbook for response Develop procedures to isolate your environment rapidly Test the technical response plan

Assemble your team in advance

External counsel, crisis communication, forensic investigations

Block unnecessary outbound internet traffic

Minimize what is permitted to connect outbound (especially SMBv1!)



Right of Bang

Execute the plan swiftly

Time is not on your side during ransomware incident
Act decisively, especially if active directory is compromised

• Leverage endpoint detection response tools

Use features in EDR to immediately contain compromised endpoints

Monitor active directory for suspicious activity

Build alerting capabilities for anomalous behavior

Forensic investigation should guide your actions

Ensure the threat actor is eradicated before any restore actions occur

• Have a model for restoration

Only introduce systems after they are considered clean

OTHER USEFUL REFERENCE MATERIALS

CISA Ransomware Guide

- Very useful for embedding a playbook into your incident response plan specific to ransomware scenarios
- Includes Ransomware Prevention Best Practices (many of which I covered) and a Ransomware Response Checklist

Incident Response Team

- Besides your internal team, make sure you have the following members on your bench should a full-scale crisis be on your hands
 - External counsel
 - Role: Provide privilege communications, legal expertise for breach notifications, help with crypto payment through broker
 - They should be the first you should call
 - Cyber insurance provider (if you have it)
 - Role: Cover breach related costs
 - Should be notified of any significant incident
 - Computer forensic investigation
 - Role: Investigate systems to identify source of incidents, guide eradication efforts, confirm containment, etc.
 - They should be engaged through your external counsel
 - Crisis communications
 - Role: Assist with external communications and messaging
 - May or may not be engaged depending on scope of incident and internal expertise
 - Law enforcement
 - Role: May be able to assist with ransomware decryption and identify threat actor
 - Consult external counsel before engaging, but local FBI cyber team should be on your list of contacts and DHS